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The United States (US) Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Section 342 determines 44 adulterated food principally as food that bears or contains: "any poisonous or deleterious 45 substance which may render it injurious to health." The US FDA "Mitigation Strategies to 46 Protect Food Against Intentional Adulteration: Guidance for Industry" defines a contaminant 47 as "any biological, chemical, physical, or radiological agent that may be added to food to 48 intentionally cause illness, injury, or death" (FDA, 2018a). However other sources distinguish 49 between the use of the terms "adulterant" and "contaminant", with some stating that 50 unintentional contamination of food is the focus of established food safety measures (Mitenius, 51 Kennedy & Busta, 2014), and adulteration is within the area of food fraud. In this context, 52 adulteration is considered by the food industry as "the addition of an undeclared material into 53 a food item or raw material for economic gain" (BRC, 2018:108) or for wider fraudulent 54 counterfeiting) and food defence mitigation strategies i.e. malicious contamination, extortion, 93 espionage, and cyber-crime. The scope of PAS 96 (2017) is wider than that suggested by the 94 FDA (2018a) in terms of food defence which states that: 95 "Acts of intentional adulteration may take several forms: acts intended to cause wide scale 96 public health harm, such as acts of terrorism focused on the food supply; acts of disgruntled 97 employees, consumers, or competitors; and economically motivated adulteration (EMA)… 98
Acts of disgruntled employees, consumers, and competitors are generally intended to attack 99 the reputation of a company, and EMA is intended to obtain economic gain. In the spectrum of 100 risk associated with intentional adulteration of food, attacks intended to cause wide scale public 101 health harm to humans are ranked as the highest risk. Therefore, the IA [interntional 102 adulteration] rule is focused on addressing those acts and not acts of disgruntled employees, 103 consumers, or competitors, or acts of EMA." 104
This shows a clear differentiation between regulatory requirements with regard to the scope 105 of food defence plans and market compliance approaches that require the use of Threat 106
Analysis Critical Control Point (TACCP) via the use of the PAS 96 guidelines as a pre-requisite 107 to supply. TACCP focuses not only on the threat but also the typology of perpetrators that 108 need to be considered when developing a food defence strategy including: the extortionist, the 109 extremist, the irrational individual and here perpetrators suffering with mental health issues 110 should be considered, the disgruntled individual especially those who have previously worked 111 for a food business and/or associated supply chain and the hacktivist or cybercriminal. 112 Therefore, food defense encompasses the active steps taken, the protection activities, and/or 113 the security assurance process or procedures, often called countermeasures, that deliver product 114 safety with regard to intentional acts of adulteration to cause harm (Manning & Soon, 2016) . 115
The term food defense describes what needs to be done i.e. procedures, protocols, or processes 116 to mitigate a given activity or threat rather than focusing on the specific taxonomy of activities 117 or perpetrators. Increasingly, these procedures and protocols are seen by retailers, 118 manufacturers and food service as a pre-requisite to supply (Wiśniewska, 2015) . However, in 119 order to be able to implement effective food defense mitigation strategies, a clear understanding 120 of the potential threats, and associated motivations and rationalisation used by perpetrators and 121 also the agents they might employ is essential. This level of understanding is further framed by 122 determining how to develop countermeasures that reduce both the capability of the perpetrators 123 to take action and also reduce the opportunities for such action to occur. 124
The aim of this paper is develop the taxonomy of food defence threats in order to postulate 125 what forms the associated food defense strategies need to take. The methodological approach 126 employed was to undertake a review of existing literature to then frame the conceptual research. 127
Screening of both academic and grey literature has demonstrated there is limited previous 128
research in terms of food defence strategies at the level of the food organisation. This is 129 especially true of emerging threats defined in PAS 96 such as hacktivism or cybercrime. This 130 is the research gap that this paper seeks to address. 131
Taxonomy of food defense threats and perpetrators 132

Intentional impact orientated adulteration and extortion 133
At its simplest the taxonomy of food defense threats for impact orientated adulteration 134 rather than EMA can be described in terms of adulteration through the use of hazardous agents 135
i.e. biological agents, chemical agents, physical agents and radiological agents (Dalziel, 2009; 136 Fredrickson, 2014) . The diversity of these agents is complex driven primarily by ease of access 137 e.g. the decision to use glass which is readily available versus radionuclear material which is 138 not, and secondly, the means and opportunity for contamination e.g. on farm, within 139 manufacturing and processing, food service, retail or the home (Meulenbelt, 2018) . Table 1  140 synthesizes data on confirmed incidents in the literature, examples of agents used by location 141 in the supply chain and their impact. The data shows that confirmed incidents are 142 predominantly at the tertiary stages of the supply chain and also in the home some of which 143 are cases of domestic poisoning which do not fit within a reflection on food defense strategies 144 employed at organisational level. The majority of the confirmed cases take place pre-harvest 145 (n=365), then in the home (n=265) and then at retail and food service (n=89). Agents used at 146 farm level have included glyphosate, plant toxin, cyanide, and rodenticide, with a much wider 147 range of agents at food service and retail level. 148 Table 1  149 150 These incidents are linked to the extortionist, the extremist, the irrational or disgruntled 151 individual i.e. perpetrators either internal or external to the organisation who have opportunity 152 to commit this offense. Extortion can be described as the actions undertaken to obtain 153 something which the perpetrator values (e.g. money, assets, influence or impact) from a person 154 or organisation by force, intimidation, threat or illegal activity. Information on extortion cases 155 in the food supply chain rarely appear in the public domain, but one incident with Heinz Baby 156 Food in the United Kingdom (UK) was the catalyst in the 1990s for tamper evident packaging 157 and improved product security within the distribution chain and on retail shelves. 158
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Case study 1: Heinz Baby Food 1988 159
In 1989 Heinz had to withdraw from sale batches of baby food in the UK worth an 160 estimated £30 million pounds when Rodney Whitchelo, a former Scotland Yard detective who 161 was later sentenced to seventeen years in prison, attempted to extort millions of pounds from 162 the food giant by spiking the food with bleach and razor blades (The Independent, 1999). Fisher 163 (1989) highlights how after the initial publicity about contamination of food, copy-cat cases 164 occurred causing concern and fear to escalate with 220 reported incidents of baby food 165 contamination in April 1989. However police first began their investigations in August 1988 166 when £20,000 was demanded by the extortionist and paid into a bank account and then subsequently removed from various cash points (ATMs). After the initial payments stopped 168 the extortionist demanded £1 million from Heinz contaminating two cans of baby food after 169 the demand. The perpetrator was eventually charged, tried and imprisoned. This case study 170
shows the challenges of the renegade insider who commits a crime whilst being aware of the 171 protocols and checks and balances in place within criminal investigations i.e. they can 172 circumvent the food defence systems that have been designed and implemented . This case is 173 not alone. 174
In a case in 2016 in the UK an extortionist who demanded £2 million not to contaminate 175 food with cyanide was traced through his DNA on the stamp on the letter and was jailed for 176 seven years. The vial sent with the letter contained five to ten lethal doses of cyanide (Smith, 177 2016) . In September 2017, a German man was charged with threatening to put poisoned baby 178 food throughout Europe with a demand to multiple supermarkets for nearly £8.8 million (Licea, 179 2017: Rojas, 2017) . The man's DNA was found on five jars that were recovered from stores 180 and then found to contain ethylene glycol. Psychological issues were cited as a mitigating issue 181 with the perpetrator, but this was rejected in court and he was found guilty of attempted murder 182 and extortion and sentenced to twelve and a half years in prison (BBC, 2018). 183
Case Study 2: Fonterra, New Zealand (NZ) 184
In November 2014, Fonterra was the victim of anonymous threats to contaminate 185 commercial milk supplies with sodium fluroacetate or 1080, a pesticide, unless its usage was 186 halted on farm (Manhire, 2015) . Highly concentrated levels of 1080 were mixed with infant 187 formula and posted to Fonterra and Federated Farmers with a letter stating contaminated infant 188 milk powder would enter the Chinese and other markets (NZHerald, 2016). Whilst 189 ecoterrorism was cited by some as a possible motive that led to the £18 million costs of the 190 incident, a NZ businessman, Jeremy Kerr was subsequently jailed for eight and a half years 191 after pleading guilty to two charges of attempted blackmail and the judge ruled that as he owned a company that made an alternative pesticide to 1080 this had motivated his activities because 193 of the potential economic gain (BBC, 2016). The extortion threat required the dairy 194 organisation, Fonterra, to take action to develop a robust methodology for detection of 1080 in 195 milk and powdered milk products (Cooney, Varelis & Bendall, 2016) . Cooney et al. (2016) 196 state that having developed and validated the methodology between January and July 2015, 197 136,000 fluid milk samples were tested as part of a multi-agency food defense strategy to 198 maintain confidence in the safety of NZ milk and dairy products. This case study highlights 199 the challenge of addressing a food defense incident early on in the investigation, especially 200
where no existing tests exist to check for the presence of the reported agent in the supply chain, 201 the crucial role of intelligence and the need for police forces to work closely with food 202 businesses. The risk of food terrorism was hinted at in this case study, but food terrorism is a 203 real threat and is now considered. 204
Food terrorism 205
Terrorism is defined in Title 22 Chapter 38 of US. Code 2656f as "premeditated, 206 politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant [civilian] targets by 207 subnational groups or clandestine agents." The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2014) 208 define terrorism as "the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals 209 or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve political, 210 religious or ideological objectives." Terrorist activities, usually but not always undertaken by 211 non-nation actors, are designed to engender fear, terror, panic and anxiety in the population 212 and as a result reduce the level of confidence in the government, leading to uncertainty and 213 political instability (Alvarez et al. 2010 : Fredrickson, 2014 or the attainment of a specific 214 political goal (Nestle, 2003) . Food terrorism is defined as "the deliberate (or threat of) 215 contamination of food with hazardous agents (biological, chemical, physical, or radionuclear) 216 for the purpose of causing injury or death and/or disrupting social, economic, or political 217 stability" (Fredrickson, 2014:311) . Thus food terrorism, if it occurs, could cause severe health 218 implications to the population and economic and trade disruption either through direct costs 219 due to the culling of livestock, disposal of food products and the potential compensation paid 220 to farmers and producers and the impact on public health services including the cost of 221 hospitalisation (Manning et al. 2005 ). Further, food terrorism can lead to consequential loss to 222 the local or national economy, loss of consumer confidence in the food supply chain and loss 223 of political confidence and support following a major food product recall or the mass culling 224 of livestock (Manning et al. 2005 ). An example of the impact on public health services of a 225 terrorism incident is the 1995 nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway system that caused 12 226 deaths and required 5000 people to seek medical attention involving 131 ambulances, 1364 227 emergency technicians and over 4000 people needing to get to medical care themselves (WHO, 228 2002). A similar incident associated with food could have equal impact. In 2011, there was an 229 Escherichia coli O104:H4 outbreak in Germany associated with sprouts from fenugreek seeds 230 which was not explicitly connected to a food defence threat, but its impact demonstrates how 231 a similar food defense issue could cause significant challenges. Between May 2011 and July 232 2011, the outbreak involved 3,842 cases (including 2,987 cases of gastrointestinal disease 233 characterised by diarrhea), with 855 cases of hemolytic uremic syndrome (HUS) and 53 deaths 234 (RKI, 2012) with at the peak of the outbreak more than 50 reported cases of HUS per day 235 (McIntyre & Monaghan, 2016). The outbreak caused widespread concern and panic and a 236 change to eating habits, as well as economic consequences impact particularly for farmers with 237 the EU paying 220 million Euros for the loss of income (Burger, 2012) . 238
Terrorism acts can be differentiated by those that seek to cause actual harm to 239 individuals or populations and alternatively those acts that are symbolic to provoke anxiety and 240 concern, and to change consumer behaviour leading to economic loss (Alvarez et al. 2010) . 241
The World Health Organisation (WHO) in their 2002 Report "Terrorist threats to food: guidance for establishing and strengthening prevention and response systems" states that an 243 essential means to preventing food terrorism is the development, validation, implementation, 244 monitoring and effective verification of food safety management programmes and their 245 associated security measures, described here as countermeasures. To minimise risk, the report 246 states that effective prevention requires food defence strategies to provide a concerted approach 247 between government and industry. Prevention is not the only approach within food defence 248 strategies, surveillance is another element that should be employed. Agro-terrorism is the 249 deliberate introduction of an animal or plant disease with the goal of generating fear, causing 250 economic losses, and/or undermining social stability (Monke, 2007) . 251
Agro-defence, the actions that can be taken to reduce the likelihood of an agro-terrorism 252 incident specifically can be addressed through the use of emerging testing methods such as 253 biosensors, colourmetric assays and digital apps that could prove to be an opportunity for early 254 detection of agents such as viruses or pathogens (Neethirajan, Ragavan, & Weng, 2018) . 255
However, a recent conviction for planning of terrorism acts in the UK was determined through 256 traditional policing/anti-terrorism methods. 257
Case study 3: Kerry Foods, UK 258
Temporary factory worker Munir Mohammed who was involved in ready meal manufacture at 259 the Kerry Foods factory, and a pharmacist, Rowaida El Hasssan were arrested in December 260 2016 and convicted in January 2018 of planning a terrorist attack using food as the vehicle 261 (Stones, 2018) . They were arrested after counter-terrorism surveillance identified that they had 262 undertaken extensive on-line research on acetone peroxide or TATP and ricin both realistic 263 agents for a terror attack on the food supply. The food company as well as the UK population 264 were potential victims here. Kerry Foods were unaware that Munir Mohammed had been 265
working illegally at the factory as he used EU documents in another man's name to gain work 266 at the factory (Kreft & Crowson, 2018) . This shows how important induction checks are for 267 assuring that individuals working at food factories are who they claim to be. However these 268
checks have limited preventive capacity if individuals intentionally lie about their identity. 269
Other examples of recent food related terror threats include: in June 2016, Italian anarchists 270 threatened to contaminate foodstuff in supermarkets in Lombardy with herbicide and in 271
December 2016, Greek anarchists claimed they had contaminated several food and drink 272 products of multinational companies (EUROPOL, 2017). However intentional adulteration 273 linked to the product is just one type of overt threat that needs to be addressed by food defense 274 strategies. Clandestine or covert threats, where activities or the identity of perpetrators is 275 purposefully hidden (Lord, 2015) are now considered. 276
Covert Threats (Sabotage) 277
In history, there have been multiple occasions when civilian food supplies have been 278 Thus, a saboteur is an individual who deliberately damages or destroys assets or infrastructure 286 in order to weaken an enemy or make a protest (Collins Dictionary, nd). At the supply chain 287 level, sabotage involves the "destruction of essential infrastructure affects people's ability to 288 access, process, distribute and utilise food." (Koc, Jernigan, & Das, 2007:321) or a clandestine 289 act to destroy, damage or render assets unusable (Douthit, 1987) . The motivation for 290 sabotage behaviour is a wish to ''damage, disrupt, or subvert the organisation's operations for 291 the personal purposes of the saboteur by creating unfavourable publicity, embarrassment, 292 delays in production, damage to property, the destruction of working relationships, or the 293 harming of employees or customers'' (Crino, 1994:312) . In this context, industrial sabotage 294 can be seen as a form of counterproductive work behaviour (CWB) i.e. wilful behaviour by 295 employees that could cause harm to fellow employees or the organisation itself (Spector & argue that sabotage can be a singular or group activity, demonstrates underlying industrial 300 conflict, and may link with other deviant and often irrational behaviour. Therefore the potential 301
for an employee to undertake sabotage could be highlighted in advance by other negative 302 behaviours such as absenteeism, low morale and job satisfaction, stress, and poor performance 303 with job satisfaction being the mediating factor (Alias, Mohd Rasdi, Ismail, & Abu Samah, 304 2013). This work suggests that early warning systems can be developed to identify those 305 employees more likely to commit sabotage and to implement preventive strategies including 306 improving staff morale to reduce the risk of occurrence. A sense of injustice or inequality can 307 also be a leading motivational factor in workplace sabotage as can a sense of powerlessness or 308 lack of autonomy. Frustration, often a secondary motivational factor, is triggered by previous 309 incidents that then fuels anger, and a transition by workers from being rule compliance to 310 bending the rules i.e. simple deviance from prescribed organisational norms to ultimately 311 breaking the rules during work activities. This behaviour may have negative intent, be 312 motivated more simply by a need to meet organisational goals that cannot otherwise be met by 313 compliant behaviour, as a mechanism to reduce workplace boredom i.e. a means of 314 entertainment or to deliver what the perpetrator believes is a form of retaliatory action or 315 restorative justice (Ambrose, Seabright & Schminke, 2002) . Reducing the risk of actions seen 316 by employees as restorative justice lies at the heart of how sabotage can be prevented by food 317 defence strategies. This includes the development of positive organisational culture to reduce 318 the potential for power dynamics, reducing management decisions that can be perceived as 319 driving inequality within the workplace or supply chain and not promoting goals (financial, 320 operational etc.) that can only be achieved by deviant behaviour. 321
There is limited evidence in the literature of sabotage in the food supply chain so a more 322 detailed example case study is not provided here. 323
Covert Threats (Industrial Espionage) 324
Private or confidential information means "any kind of information which the 325 organisation feels should not be freely available to outsiders and which therefore should be 326 subject to some kind of moral or legal protection." (Crane, 2005:237) . Consideration of 327 espionage in the food science literature is novel and thus requires the development of the 328 terminology used in other sectors that can then be applied to food defense threats. Crane (2005) 329 states that the test of whether an activity can be determined as espionage is to consider: the 330 nature of the information that is under threat, the tactics employed, and the purpose for which 331 the information will be used. There are multiple tactics that Crane suggests could be defined 332 as questionable (Table 2) including breaking and entering into a competitor's premises to steal 333 information through to posing as fictitious supplies, potential employees or customers. In order 334 for such threats to be actioned it may involve stealing the information, infiltration using insiders 335 to report, electronic eavesdropping or covert recording to gain information or material, or 336 remote attacks through digital systems (PAS 95, 2017), or to weaken the capabilities, reputation 337 and brand value of a competing business (van Arnam, 2001). 338
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Estimates of the cost of such activity to US industry run between $45 billion and $100 340 billion per annum; an average of $50 million per incident and a loss of employment estimated 341 at six million jobs (van Arnam, 2001). Industrial espionage can also be described as corporate spying, corporate espionage, or economic espionage. Essentially, industrial espionage is the 343 use of espionage or spying techniques often focused on commercial rivals for commercial 344 purposes e.g. seeking to access trade secrets, intellectual property (IP) such as patents, 345 copyrights, trademarks, recipes, product formulations, theories, software, processing 346 techniques, designs or data that could impact brand value for commercial advantage (Crane, 347 2005; Bogadi, Banović, & Babić, 2016). e.g. production details, strategic or marketing 348 information (Budiono, & Sawitri, 2017) . 
Case study 4: East India Company -Tea 359
In 1848, the British wanted to be able to grow tea in India and break into a trade 360 monopolised at the time by China (Budiono, & Sawitri, 2017) . Therefore the East India Co. 361 employed a botanist, Robert Fortune, to visit China and to smuggle materials and obtain the 362 information on growing tea plants and the making/processing of tea (Fortune, 1852; Budiono, 363 & Sawitri, 2017). Sigley (2015) explores this case in more detail: 364 "[Fortune] was given the task of travelling to China, and in particular to the tea growing 365 regions of Fujian and Anhui, to collect tea seeds and live tea seedlings and transport them 366 back to India. He was also directed to obtain as much knowledge about the tea production 367 process as possible. Robert Fortune's mission was very successful. He collected a large horde 368 of tea plants and seeds and also convinced a number of tea farmers from Anhui to go with 369 him to India to assist in the growing and production of the tea." (Sigley, 2015 :332) 370
The case of espionage described here involved the stealing of physical material and 371 information, however modern food defence strategies also need to include strategies to prevent 372 covert digital threats such as cyber-crime and hacktivism. 373
Covert threats (Cyber-attacks) 374
Identity is the characteristics that determine who or what a person, product or 375 organisation is and this identity can exist in both the physical and in the digital arena. Thus The nature of cyber threats is evolving rapidly and there is constant evolution in 396 technology and the ability to infiltrate digital networks (Khursheed, Kumar, & Sharma, 2016) . 397
Bendovschi (2015) divides cyber-attacks into four categories, based on the objective of the 398 attack namely: cyber-crime, cyber espionage, cyber war (not considered here) and hacktivism. 399
Cyber-crime is the unauthorised access to electronic communication and databases, networks, 400 programmes and data in order to "compromise the confidentiality, integrity and availability of 401 information" that belongs to given organisations or supply chains (Bendovschi, 2015:25) . 402
Cyber espionage is essentially the ability to obtain data without the permission of the data 403 owner (Dawson, 2018) . Particular mechanisms and techniques that fall within the scope of such 404 cyber attacks include phishing, malware, and distributed denial of service (DDos) see Table 3 . 405 Table 3  406 In 2012, two Romanian men admitted participating in an international conspiracy that hacked 407
Take in
into Subway credit-card payment terminals at more than 150 Subway restaurant franchises and 408 stole data from more than 146,000 compromised cards with more than $10 million in losses 409 (Gross, 2012; Khursheed, Kumar, & Sharma, 2016) . The work of Bendovschi (2015) highlights 410 that while the public sector such as government, or law enforcement is most likely to be the 411 victim of cyber espionage, cyber war and hacktivism techniques, cyber-crime is a problem for 412 all business sectors. The UK Cyber Security Breaches Survey (2018) highlights that 43% of 413 businesses surveyed in 2017 (n=1519) identified they had been victim to a cyber attack in the 414 previous twelve months rising to 72% in large businesses (250 employees or more) and only 415 27% of the businesses had a formal cyber security policy, 13% had a formal cyber security 416 incident management process and 9% held specific cyber security insurance. Further in the survey only 20% of businesses had staff who had attended a cybersecurity training session in 418 the last twelve months barriers to take-up being cost, format and access and not seeing the need 419 for training. The multiple types of cyber-attack highlighted in Table 3 e.g. brute force attack, 420 distributed denial of service, financial attack, data corruption or data exposure, man in the 421 middle attacks, phising, malware, scareware and system penetration are all viable food defense 422 risks that sit outside the definition of intentional product adulteration. The biggest vulnerability 423 to cyber-attacks was where staff used personal devices for work or cloud computing. McGuire 424 (2012) proposed a typology of six types of cybercrime groups with three subgroups each with 425 two subtypes (Table 4) . 426
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The three types are firstly online offending via a swarm typical of hacktivist groups, hubs that 428 drive phishing attacks or use of scareware, type 2 hybrids with both online and offline 429 offending either as clusters or extended networks and thirdly mainly offline groups. This final 430 type can be based on hierarchical groups or temporary assemblages of aggregate groups that 431 can align and then realign. The existence of these cyber criminal groups means that food supply 432 chain organisations need to be on their guard and have effective food defense strategies to 433 mitigate risk. Further empirical research needs to be undertaken to determine whether this is 434 actually the case. 435
Cybersecurity can be described as the countermeasures taken to protect a computer system 436 and associated storage clouds or individual appliance against an intentional malicious target 437 attack and/or unauthorised access and unintentional or accidental access (Soon, Manning & 438 Smith, 2019) . ISO 27001:2013 Information Security Management Systems is the international 439 standard that sets out a series of requirements for establishing, implementing, monitoring and 440 improving an Information Security Management System (ISMS). Security management is the 441 "systematic and coordinated activities and practices through which an organiaation optimally 442 manages its risks, and the associated potential threats and impacts there from" (ISO 443 28000:2007). Security management is critical with regard to digital security and also with 444 physical security in the supply chain as addressed by ISO 28000 especially with regard to 445 threats such as theft, or terrorism. Specific and generic food defence strategies are now 446 discussed. 447
Food defence strategies: supply chain and organisational levels 448
To be successful, perpetrators of the activities described in this paper rely on a lack of 449 preparedness by the victim (Olson, 2012 : Wiśniewska, 2015 . Therefore, in order to be 450 effective, food defence strategies needs to consider the perpetrator, the relevance of the impact 451 of potential attacks in terms of risk to the consumer, and also how that frames the perpetrators 452 motivation to cause harm (Manning and Soon, 2016) . 453
Food defense strategies 454
Food defence risk assessment, especially with regard to microbial agents, should consider the 455 availability of potential agents, the potential perpetrator, the means of weaponisation and the 456 deliver of the agent, and the likelihood of detection between dissemination and infection as 457 well as product associated risks such as geopolitical factors, specific consumer populations at 458 risk, psychological impact e.g. threats centred on foods used for religious ceremonies and the 459 challenge of mixing or diluting the agent in a given product (Elad, 2005) . The FDA require 460 food defence vulnerability assessments (FDA, 2018b) such as CARVER+Shock, whilst GFSI 461 (2017) refers to food defence threat assessment such as TACCP. Risk assessment methods 462 currently used by the industry include TACCP (see Manning and Soon (2016) for a wider 463 discussion) and a combined food safety (hazard analysis critical control point or HACCP). 464
Another approach is to develop a food defence plan using a hazard analysis critical control and 465 defense points (HACCP-DP) plan, where HACCPDP is an extension of a food safety plan and 466 TACCP is a stand-alone threat and vulnerability risk assessment process and associated plan 467 (Wiśniewska, (2015) . Essentially the process for developing a HACCP-DP plan as outlined by 468
Yoe and Schwartz (2010) is to build on the established seven principles and twelve steps of 469 HACCP with three further steps to build the food defence element: 470  Step 1determine critical defence points (CDPs) in your process 471  Step 2define food defence mitigation (more recently termed countermeasures) 472
 Step 3implement test, assess and maintain defence mitigation activities 473
This holistic approach is limited within the scope of food defence used in this paper as it would 474
mainly address examples of intentional adulteration rather than food defence threats such as 475 espionage, cyber-crime and hacktivism that are not necessarily related to food product 476 adulteration. The HACCP-DP approach and requires those applying the tool to have 477 appropriate training on food safety, food fraud (if that falls within the scope of the HACCP-478 DP) and food defence. The application of TACCP aims to reduce the likelihood and 479 consequences of a food fraud or a food defence threat being realised. The scope of TACCP 480 includes both EMA, wider aspects of food fraud such as counterfeiting and also intentional 481 adulteration, food terrorism, and extortion, as well as covert activities such as sabotage, 482 espionage and cybercrime. HACCP-DP, and TACCP both use a semi-quantitative risk 483 assessment as does CARVER-SHOCK approaches and vulnerability analysis critical control 484 point (VACCP) and wider vulnerability assessment tools. This creates a challenge in that only 485 known and assessable threats can be prioritised in this way. Indeed the greatest flaw in these 486 approaches is the recognised hazard (threat), control measure (countermeasure) and then a 487
subjective scoring system to identify CCPs or CDPs. The weaknesses embedded in assessing 488 non-microbial food safety hazards via a HACCP, translates to TACCP in terms of what is 489 deemed an acceptable risk has both scientific, legal and moral aspects and thus is a relative 490 construct and not just a binary decision. However as Wiśniewska (2015) outlines the advantage 491 of using HACCP-based approaches to build food defence strategies is that they are familiar to 492 the food industry and thus are more easily adopted and integrated into existing systems and 493 practices. A concern that can be raised though, is that whilst a food safety HACCP plan is in 494 continuous use and this maintains familiarity with controls and preventive and corrective 495 actions, food defence issues occur much less frequently and this means that knowledge and 496 understanding of food defence strategies and how they are employed may be lost unless regular 497 refresher training is undertaken Further, given the very relative low probability of a deliberate 498 food defense event, some organisations may feel that the costs of implementing food defense 499 plans is disproportionate to the actual risk (Davidson et al. 2017 ). The risk assessment tools 500 (HACCP, TACCP< VACCP. HACCP-DP) considered here have limited value in terms of 501 unknown or unquantifiable threats creating then potential for vulnerabilities to be unrecognised 502 and this leads to the possibility that decision-makers may identify a subsequent incident as 503 being unforeseeable. 504
Guardians and hurdles 505
Appealing to criminology literature gives rise to specific terminology which those developing 506 food defence strategies meet to be conversant with. The crime triangle as explored by Spink et 507 al. (2016) includes consideration of the perpetrator, the victim and how opportunity for the 508 activity to take place is mediated by guardians and hurdles. The food defence team members 509 and the plan implementers roles are to be "guardians" i.e. the individuals operating at supply 510 chain or individual business or production line levels (Spink et al. 2015 (barriers, enclosed production systems), or artefact-based hurdles such as procedures and 520 protocols or cyber-protection via firewalls and virus software. Thus the HACCP-DP plan will 521 signpost to relevant hurdles and guardians as well as defining countermeasures that are adopted 522 within food defense strategies to mitigate risk. Countermeasures for food defence are often the same global or specific protocols and policies 533 that have been developed as part of existing pre-requisite programmes such as good 534 manufacturing practice (GMP) or good hygienic practice (GHP). 535
With regard to cyber attacks specifically, organisations need to have a clear 536 defence strategy and will often need outside expertise to assist them to reduce vulnerability. 537
Bendovschi (2015) determines three kinds of countermeasure within a cybersecurity strategy: 538 preventive security controls that aim to prevent the realisation of a threat i.e. to restrict and 539 prevent unauthorised access to an organisation's network, programmes or data; detective 540 security controls that seek to detect information security threats e.g. intrusion detection systems 541 that monitors network traffic and potentially suspicious activity; corrective security controls 542 that are implemented if non-conformity is identified and implement business recovery 543 procedures after a cyber attack. 544
Concluding thoughts 545
Food defence is an under-researched phenomenon and there is limited information in the public 546 domain on the topic area. At the same time as an inherent knowledge gap in industry on what 547 food defence strategies need to address, there is an increasing requirement for organisations in 548 the food supply chain to develop and adopt food defence strategies to assure market entry 549 through third-party certification of their management systems. Certification standards include 550 those benchmarked to the GFSI standards. In order countries such as the US there is a 551 regulatory requirement to develop food defense strategies too. To develop food industry 552 guidance and to inform food defence risk assessment and management processes, a taxonomy 553 needs to be developed and accepted across the food industry so that threats can be consistently 554 identified and effectively addressed and as a result consumers, industry partners, shareholders 555 and also the organisation itself can be protected. The taxonomy developed in this research 556 frames both physical and digital threats, and overt and covert threats and introduces the term 557 impact orientated adulteration to clearly distinguish these types of product-related threats from 558 wider EMA issues. The work gives particular insight into the types of cyber crimes and cyber 559 criminals that are of concern in the food supply chain and this will support more effective risk 560 assessment of these particular types of threats. 561 562 563 
